Frege on Truth and Logic

Organizer: Sanford Shieh (Wesleyan University)
Participants: Robert May (UC Davis), Mark Textor (King’s College)

Abstract:

One of the central ideas about logic that emerged in Frege’s work is that logic is not (just) a calculating system, but a system of representation, and that it is in virtue of this that logic can be understood as an abstract characterization of thought. On this view, the accuracy of representations — their truth — becomes of central importance. Frege’s views of truth and logic, however, have been found perplexing and at odds with other Fregean commitments. These issues set the theme for this symposium, which explores the connections among Frege’s theses on truth in his mature philosophy.

Titles and Abstracts of the talks

1.
Robert May: Judgement and Truth
Central to Frege’s critique of psychologism is his insistence that logical derivation be kept distinct from making a judgement, only the latter being a psychological notion. The role of logic is to show how judgements — i.e. truths — follow from other judgement. Making a judgement is different. It is the recognition that a thought is a truth: Whether a thought is a judgement is not a manifest property, but rather something which agents come to know by reflective awareness. Frege’s view is that truth is to be understood via its role in this cognitive process. understood in this context, I will argue, Frege’s view of truth as objectual, arbitrary and primitive makes sense in his overall view of logic and the generation of knowledge.

2.
Sanford Shieh: Logic and the Amodality of Truth
In this paper I propose an interpretation of Frege’s rejection of any relativization of truth and falsity, to thinker, time, place, or circumstance. Frege’s view rests on the factivity of judgment, which in turn follows from a conception of judgment as advancing from representation to the obtaining of what is represented. Without relativization of truth, there is no necessary or possible truth as truth with respect to all or some circumstances. Hence one upshot of this interpretation is that Frege is committed to rejecting the ancient Aristotelian view of logic as dealing with what follows of necessity.

3.
Mark Textor: Comments on May and Shieh
Professor Textor will be commenting on the talks of May and Shieh, and so no abstract is required.